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 Abstract 
 
In a white paper to the parliament the Norwegian Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs in 2004 noted that while many of the recent national films 
could show a healthy return on its private capital of more than 50 percent 
there seemed to be a notable lack of participation from the traditional 
investment community in the financing of these films. This report explores 
the economic reasons for the lack of involvement applying a project 
financing perspective. 
 
A financing and performance review of all the Norwegian films that were 
theatrically released in 2005 reveals that while these films collectively lost 
20 percent of their private capital some showed very strong returns for their 
private investors and others produced severe losses. Generally, the 
distribution of performance outcomes did not converge to an average and 
extreme outcomes were common.  
 
It is also demonstrated how positioning within a film’s structured finance 
affects investment risk, and how the conditions to which public funding is 
offered affects conditions for private financing.  
 
The findings indicate at least two possible reasons as to why the traditional 
investment community in Norway may be hesitant to participate in feature 
film financing: An overall negative return on private capital and extreme 
performance outcomes for the individual projects. However, the analysis 
also shows that the right application of layered finance may open for 
investment opportunities more attractive to risk-averse investors from 
outside the film industry. 
 
Key words: Film financing, structured finance, cultural policy, public 
funding, film industry. 
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Preface 
 
The Norwegian film sector operates in both spheres of culture and 
commerce, and understanding its operation in light of one requires an 
understanding of its position in the other. For instance, the Norwegian Film 
Fund, which is its largest contributor of capital, does not invest on a 
commercial basis but to fulfill certain objectives in the government’s cultural 
policy. This research report investigates private capital investments and the 
lack of participation from the traditional financial sector, and its perspective 
is thus primarily the one shared by most private investors, - the film sector as 
commerce. This perspective does not ignore its cultural significance, and I 
hope the findings presented herein will be informative for both perspectives. 
 
I would like to thank The Norwegian Media Authority (RAM), the 
Norwegian Film Fund, as well as those in the industry who let themselves 
interview, for making this research project possible. 
 
December 2007 
 
Terje Gaustad 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is sometimes said that the most creative work done in the film business is 
carried out far away from the lights and cameras by the people who finance 
the films. While in most cases this statement may be greatly exaggerated, it 
suggests that film financing is not always a straight forward transparent 
process accessible to any potential financier. 
 
In a white paper to the parliament the Norwegian Ministry of Culture and 
Church Affairs in 2004 noted that while many of the recent national films 
could show a healthy return on its private capital of more than 50 percent 
there seemed to be a notable lack of participation from the traditional 
investment community in the financing of these films. And it went on to ask 
why it is so, since many of the film producers at the same time seemed to 
lack the capital base needed secure equity capital for their films (St. meld. 
Nr. 25, 2003-2004). 
 
A brief review of the international film business trade papers will reveal that 
the problem is not exclusive to the Norwegian film business, but that it 
resounds internationally with various strength from territory to territory. 
Furthermore, European public funding bodies for the film sector seem to be 
increasingly concerned with how more private finance can be linked with 
their public finance1. 
 
This exploratory study will seek to identify and discuss some key factors that 
may explain why investors from the traditional financial community so often 
do not participate in film financing even when the potential return on 
investment seems healthy. Due to their lack of involvement these financiers 
may be defined as outsiders to the film business. Key questions then become 
what challenges and opportunities these outside investors face if they are 
considering to enter into film financing and how the film business insiders 
better can attract the outsiders to participate. 
 
First, the study will review the financing of all Norwegian films released 
theatrically in 2005 to determine how the financing was typically composed. 
It will also map the market performance of these films to estimate earnings 
and return on investments. Based on this data the challenges and 
opportunities for outsider financiers will be analyzed and discussed. 
 
                                                 
1 This was for example a central theme at the EU conference “New Horizons for 
Europe’s Audiovisual Sector” (Utrecht, 25.-27.9.04). 
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The study is done within a framework of project financing2 literature. The 
project financing literature offers reference to and experience from 
challenges in structuring financing for a wide variety of sectors and 
industries that are similar to those met in film financing.  
 
1.1 Methodology 
The empirical analysis is primarily based on documentation provided by the 
Norwegian Film Fund. This public funding organization was involved with 
all the national films released theatrically in 2005, and the set of 
documentation collected for their own evaluation and review process for 
each film thus represents a unique and somewhat standardized source of 
evidence. Included in the documentation on each film was the financing 
plan, which provided valuable information about financing structure, and the 
main distribution agreement, which typically includes provisions about the 
allocation of revenues. Furthermore, the producers are obligated to copy the 
Film Fund on their film’s earnings statements. While these were not always 
complete, partly due to the fact that some of the films were not yet released 
in all media, they provided valuable evidence against which estimated 
revenues could be checked.  
 
Understandably, some of the Film Fund’s documentation had to be treated 
confidentially. So while this report can present exact average values and 
examples from actual deals, it cannot give a complete picture for each 
identifiable film. However, for the objective of the report this is also not 
necessary.  
 
In addition to the Film Fund documentation, the study draws on interviews 
with the producers who were responsible for the financing of their respective 
film. The interviews complemented the film fund documentation, and did 
also offer information on details that were not necessarily included in the 
paperwork for every film. Producers for seven of the total nineteen films 
were interviewed. 
                                                 
2 See Finnerty (1996) for an introduction and overview. 
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2. Film Financing 
 
The financing of Norwegian theatrical feature films, most independent films 
internationally and to a large extend also the Hollywood studio films is best 
understood in terms of project financing3. Generally, project financing is 
used when a particular facility or a related set of assets is capable of 
functioning profitably as an independent economic unit (Finnerty, 1996). In 
the case of film financing the feature film itself constitute this set of assets. 
Project funds are used to create a film with supporting materials such as 
trailers and other marketing materials that when completed will be exploited 
to generate a cash flow from which the project finance can be serviced. 
While films are quite easily definable as independent economic units many 
have little or no prospects of showing any profits, but this is typically 
compensated by one or more public funding parties willing to take the 
economic loss and thereby providing the remaining financing parties with a 
real possibility of obtaining economic benefits. 
 
The project financing literature typically focuses on other types of projects 
and on projects much larger than Norwegian feature films. Power plants, toll 
roads and pipe lines are more typical for the literature than feature films. 
Yet, as films are made on a project basis and meet the general requirements 
of project financing, the project financing literature provides a fruitful 
framework for understanding film financing. 
 
2.1 Project Financing 
Finnerty (1996) defines project financing as the raising of funds to finance 
an economically separable capital investment project in which the providers 
of the funds look primarily to the cash flow from the project as the source of 
funds to service their loans and provide the return of and return on their 
equity invested in the project.  
 
A project will have one or more sponsors who initiate it. These project 
sponsors, other providers of funds, as well as the financially responsible 
parties providing credit support and security arrangements must agree to 
make available all funds necessary to complete the project. In the film 
financing case the sponsors are the producers who initiate the film projects. 
Together with the film’s investors they must ensure that enough funds are 
available to finish the film before they commence production. Investors will 
                                                 
3 Project financing is part of the broader defined area of structured finance (Davis, 
2005). 
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often require various security arrangements such as cast and crew insurances 
and completion bonds. When contracted, the completion bond company is 
responsible for providing additional funds to see the film completed in case 
the production runs over budget due to various unforeseen events. It is 
thereby ensuring completion of the film to the other project parties (Rudman 
and Ephraim, 2004).  
 
Furthermore, the parties have to agree and ensure that when project 
completion occurs and operations commence, the project will have available 
sufficient cash to enable it to meet its operating expenses and debt service 
requirements. Completion of the film project occurs when the film is 
delivered to its distributor with all supporting materials and paperwork. The 
distributor will then exploit the film in all possible media and markets and 
this exploitation represents the operation of the project. Typically the 
distributor will provide or otherwise be responsible for the funds necessary 
to carry out the exploitation (Cones, 1997). By contracting a distributor at 
such terms before commencement of production the producer may ensure 
that sufficient cashflow will be available for the exploitation of the film. 
 
As in conventional direct financing the basic categories of project finance 
are debt and equity, but while direct financing investors will look to the 
firm’s entire asset portfolio for security and servicing of the investments, 
project financiers may only look to the project related assets and cash flow. 
The critical distinguishing feature of project financing as opposed to direct 
financing is that the project is treated as a distinct legal entity. Project assets, 
project-related contracts, and project cash flow are segregated to a 
substantial degree from the sponsoring entity. 
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the basic elements of project financing, and figure 2.2 
illustrates the same for a film project. At the center is a discrete asset or a 
related set of assets that has a specific purpose. In the film business this can 
be one single film project as observed in this study, but also a slate of film 
projects or finished films4. A project must include all the facilities that are 
necessary to constitute an economically independent, viable operating entity. 
In the case of film financing this means that the film project must include all 
elements necessary to complete delivery of the film to the distributors, which 
represent the project’s purchasers. Purchase contracts take the form of 
distribution contracts and the project’s output is the various distribution 
rights to the film. 
 
                                                 
4 Raising project financing on a slate of films seems to be an increasingly popular 
financing tool used by the bigger Hollywood based film companies (Eisbruck, 2005) 
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Suppliers are the wide range of creative and technical personnel as well as 
service providers and suppliers of raw materials ranging from film stock to 
set construction materials. These are contracted by the project entity to 
provide all input necessary to complete the film. 
 
Figure 2.1 The basic elements of a project financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Finnerty, 1996 
 
 
Figure 2.2 The basic elements of a film project financing 
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The project sponsors, or in the film business case the film producers, must 
reach financial closure5 by securing sufficient funds – debt and equity – for 
production and operations. The debt and equity elements of the project 
financing are tailored to the characteristics of the project, and key factors are 
the nature of project cash flow and the collateral value of the project’s assets. 
For film projects there will typically be a very high degree of uncertainty in 
predicting the level of cash flow generated from its exploitation. The 
demand for a specific feature film will always be uncertain up until the point 
where one can place the finished film in front of its buyers. It may be a 
commercial success generating revenues far exceeding its costs, but it may 
also flop finding very few buyers who place any positive value on it. 
Research carried out by DeVany and Walls (1999) shows that films are 
among the most risky of products as the probability distribution of their 
theatrical earnings or box-office has infinite variance. One may say that the 
film business is not a “normal” business because outcomes do not follow a 
normal probability distribution. The variance of box office revenue is 
infinite, so any cashflow projections will be highly uncertain and the level of 
risk generally taken when providing funding for a film project is thus high.  
 
The collateral value of the film project’s assets is affected by this 
uncertainty. Before the project is completed and the film released the 
collateral value will generally be low because nobody can guarantee that the 
film will not flop. In the cases where a film performs poorly in the market, 
the collateral value is furthermore affected in a negative direction due to the 
very high degree of asset specificity for most of the assets created in a film 
project. High asset specificity means that the assets cannot be redeployed 
outside the context of the project without sacrificing productive value 
(Williamson, 1985). Most of the assets are unique to the project. Footage 
shot for one film are seldom of any value whatsoever to other film projects, 
so the film it is shot for has to perform well for it to have any value.  
 
Generally, the level of uncertainty associated with a project’s ability to 
generate cash flow and the collateral value of its assets is reflected in its 
optimal debt-equity ratio. Typically, higher-risk projects take more equity to 
protect the interest of lenders, while lower-risk projects can accommodate 
more debt (Merna and Khu, 2003). Williamson (1988) links the debt-equity 
financing decision directly to asset specificity, arguing that equity financing 
is best suited where asset specificity is high. One would thus expect to find 
very high equity shares in film project financing compared to other types of 
projects offering less market uncertainty, lower asset specificity and thus 
                                                 
5 Financial closure is the point at which the project participants reach a formal 
agreement on the fundamental business structure of the project and the project's 
financing plans (Merna and Khu, 2003). 
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higher collateral value. While for example toll-road projects may see debt-
equity ratios around 95-5 (Merna and Khu, 2003), independent feature films 
made for the international market seldom see more than 20-80 (Pendreigh, 
2003).  
 
2.2 Layered Finance 
Achieving financial closure is always difficult, not only for film-projects, 
and all project financing thus require careful financial engineering to allocate 
the risks and rewards among the involved parties in a manner that is 
mutually acceptable. It is often necessary to find financing structures that 
offer more than the two basic layers of debt and equity. This allows the 
project sponsor to provide a larger group of different investors with 
instruments that match the risk/return characteristics best suited to their 
appetites and requirements. The increased pool of potential investors then 
available may allow the project sponsor both to close the financing and to 
reduce its cost of capital.  
 
Layered financing can generally be applied to both debt and equity by 
adding one or more layers of subordinated debt and preferred stock (Parra 
and Kahn, 2001), see figure 2.3. When subordinated debt is used the senior 
lender agrees to lend to a project because, relative to the subordinated 
lender(s), the subordination provides it with priority rights to both debt 
servicing and security. In return for ceding these rights to the senior lender 
and assuming greater risk, the subordinated lender benefits from the higher 
yield. 
 
Figure 2.3 Layered project financing 
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Parra and Kahn (2001) recognize three general categories of project partners 
that typically will be willing to take a subordinated position: 
- First, a project “insider” may become a subordinated lender to 
substitute debt for required equity. Among such insiders are project 
sponsors, service providers and other parties whose primary 
motivation is to ensure the sale of its product or service to the 
project vehicle. 
- Second, an “investor” not otherwise affiliated with a project or its 
sponsors but desiring to make an investment in the project because 
of its profit-making potential also may choose to become a 
subordinated lender to characterize its investment as debt rather than 
equity. Typically, these investors purchase project convertible 
(subordinated) debt and seek profits available from the conversion of 
their debt to equity if the project is successful. 
- Third, a project “catalyst”, a party unaffiliated with a project or its 
sponsors or investors that desires to promote investment in a country 
or region, may choose to become a subordinated lender by providing 
subordinated loans in amounts sufficient to motivate commercial 
lenders to participate as senior lenders in a given project’s funding. 
 
In film finance, the first category is a common ingredient in a project’s 
financing plan. Producers and key personnel as well as service providers 
often defer part of their fees to be recouped in a subordinated position. 
Furthermore, some investors, matching the second category, tend to accept 
lower priority in return for a larger share of the film’s potential upside. And 
finally for the third category, public funding bodies, whose prime motivation 
may be either to see national films produced or to attract filmmaking activity 
to their region, provide subordinated funding to help producers close 
financing on films that coincide with these goals. 
 
The line between debt and equity can sometimes seem blurry in film finance 
since equity investors do not necessarily obtain an ownership share in the 
special purpose company set up for the film, if any, or in the film’s 
copyright. However, investors who acquire a share in the films potential 
profits is typically considered equity investors while those earning interest, 
either at an ongoing rate or defined as a fixed markup on the funds provided, 
are considered lenders.  
 
2.3 Common Elements of Independent Film Finance 
The different elements of layered debt and equity finance found in any film 
project will depend on the film’s characteristics and qualities as well as on 
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the institutional environment within which it is produced. However, for so-
called independent films6 there is a set of elements that are commonly 
utilized.  These are minimum guarantees, gap loans, equity and deferments, 
and for most European productions public funding may also be added as a 
fifth element. 
 
Minimum guarantees (MGs) are advances paid by distributors against the 
producer’s share of revenues generated by the distributor from exploiting the 
film. When distribution agreements are closed before start of production the 
MGs become part of the film finance and contributes to financial closure. If 
the finished film should perform worse than anticipated when the MG was 
agreed and paid out so that the producers share of revenues actually turns out 
to be lower than the MG-amount, the difference will not be repayable to the 
distributor – thus the term minimum guarantee (Cones 1997, 1992; 
Baumgarten et al 1992). The MG is thus in essence a limited recourse loan 
from the distributor to the producer where the distributor can only look to the 
revenues it generates from exploiting the film as security for its loan. 
 
Gap loans are senior debt loans fully repayable from first revenues received 
by producer. If gap loans can be obtained and how much of the project 
financing they can cover, depends partly on the level of MGs. The higher the 
MGs, the more of the film’s revenues will be retained by the distributors to 
cover the MGs. Accordingly, with a higher level of MGs utilized in the 
financing a gap lender will have to wait longer until the film generates 
enough cash flow to start repayment of its loan. The specific terms for 
different gap loans vary, but they are typically limited recourse loans secured 
in the producer’s share of revenues, i.e. the cash flow generated by the film 
that is paid out from its distributors to the producer. 
 
Equity includes all cash investments made in consideration for a share of the 
film’s profit, if any. Sometimes an equity investment entitles the investor to 
a share ownership in the film’s copyright or in the special purpose company 
that produces and owns the film, but often the “ownership” is limited to a 
contractual share of revenues from which the investor may see the return of 
and on the investment. 
 
Deferments are all or portions of salaries or compensation for cast, crew and 
suppliers paid on a delayed basis out of the film’s revenues. The payment is 
thus contingent upon the film earning enough to pay it. A film project may 
have more than one class of deferred compensations, where one class may be 
                                                 
6 An independent film is understood as a film made outside the control of a major 
integrated production-distribution company, such as the Hollywood studios. 
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subordinated to other deferments as well as other elements in the film 
financing. 
 
Public funding provided by various public funding bodies through different 
public funding schemes is typically subordinated to all other financing 
elements, and in some cases the funding is non-recoupable. Public funding 
bodies will typically not require any share of profit or other form of 
ownership in return for the funding, so generally the public funding element 
of the financing is best described as deeply subordinated debt.  
 
A possible layered financing structure of a film project containing these five 
common elements is illustrated in figure 2.4 below. 
 
Figure 2.4 Layered film financing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.4 Recoupment: Cash Flow and Waterfall  
 
The gross income or cash flow generated from the operation of a project is 
allocated to cover its operational costs, servicing of the debt and eventually 
repayment of the debt. In the traditional corporate form of organization the 
management and board of directors decide how the cash flow is allocated, 
but when project financing is used the specific allocation of cash flow is 
governed in the project financing documents. This set of rules that prescribe 
how cash flow is allocated is known as the waterfall, and it must be agreed 
upon by all parties with an interest in the cash flow before financial closure 
can be reached (Finnerty, 1996; Bodington, 2004).   
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In what order and priority the cash flow is allocated vary from project to 
project, but typically the operating expenses are covered ahead of debt 
service and recoupment. What is left after operating expenses and lenders 
has been covered is referred to as free cash flow, and all free cash flow is 
usually distributed to the project’s equity investors (Finnerty, 1996).   
 
For a general project, a typical order of priority for the project cash waterfall 
may thus look like this (Parra and Khan, 2001): 
1. Operating expenses 
2. Senior debt service 
3. Senior debt service reserve accounts 
4. Subordinated debt service 
5. Subordinated debt service reserve accounts 
6. Restricted payments 
Any free cash flow available when these elements are covered allows equity 
investors to recoup their investments and possibly earn a profit. 
 
In a film project the cash waterfall is most often specified in the film’s net 
profit definition or net proceeds definition. In addition to defining how the 
film’s revenues will be allocated this document typically also incorporates 
the gross receipts definition, which states exactly what kind of revenues 
should be calculated into the cash flow being allocated. While the definition 
of the elements to be recouped from the gross receipts and their order vary 
from film to film, a typical but simplified order of priority for the film 
project cash waterfall may look like this (Cones, 1997; Baumgarten et al, 
1992): 
1. Distribution fees and expenses 
2. Distributor’s minimum guarantee 
3. Gap loan7 
4. Class 1 deferments 
5. Equity 
6. Class 2 deferments 
 
After the operating expenses (distribution fee and expenses) are covered, the 
cash flow is allocated to recoup the financing elements in the priority order 
given by the film’s layered financing structure illustrated in figure 2.4 above. 
In this case, the public funding is non-recoupable so no cash flow is 
allocated for it. Since the equity investors have already recouped their 
investments in fifth position any free cashflow available when these six 
elements are covered represents profit for the equity investors. 
                                                 
7 An interest reserve account for the gap loan is often built into the production 
budget as a financing cost, but still it may also be added as a separate item in the 
cash waterfall in a position above the repayment of the loan. 
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The allocation of revenues as per a waterfall similar to the case above is 
illustrated in figure 2.5 below. The only difference here is that there are no 
class 1 deferments, but only one class which is subordinated to other debt as 
well as equity. From the total gross receipts represented by the first pillar the 
film’s distribution fees and expenses are deducted off the top. From the 
remaining monies the distributor recoups its minimum guarantee, thereafter 
the gap loan is repaid, and so forth until all financing elements are recouped 
and free cash flow following operating expenses represents net profits.  
 
Figure 2.5 Waterfall recoupment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The allocation of economic risk between the film financing participants is 
easily illustrated by assuming that the film only earns half the revenues 
illustrated in figure 2.5 above. This is shown in figure 2.6 below where only 
the clear part of the first pillar above the new base line represents gross 
receipts earned by the film. Distribution fees and expenses will be covered as 
before and so will the distributor’s MG and the gap financier’s loan, but 
there will only be cash flow available to recoup a minor share of the equity 
investments. At this reduced revenues level no deferred payments can be 
made and the film will not earn any net profits. While the equity investors 
would have recouped their investment with a significant profit at the 
revenues level illustrated in figure 2.5, they would take a significant loss if 
gross receipts were reduced to half as illustrated in figure 2.6. However, the 
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distributor and gap financier providing debt finance carrying much lesser 
risk would not be affected by the shift in revenues. 
  
Figure 2.6 Waterfall recoupment with reduced revenues 
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3. The 2005 Films: Finance 
 
The total number of Norwegian feature films released theatrically in 2005 
was 19, of which four were documentaries and fifteen fiction8. The budgets 
or required financing for these films ranged from NOK 2.9 million to NOK 
22.8 million. The average budget was NOK 14.4 million, but this number is 
heavily influenced by a few very low budget films. The majority of films 
was budgeted at NOK 15 million or more, see table 3.1 and figure 3.19. 
 
The total budgets include both production and so-called print & advertising 
(P&A) costs, and reaching financial closure thus required financing both 
production and P&A budgets. All the costs required to assemble the film up 
until it is ready for delivery to the distributor are defined as production costs, 
and these included development costs (screenplay, budgeting, etc.), cost of 
principal photography (actors, film stock, etc.) and post production costs 
(editing, music, etc.). P&A costs are the ‘print and advertising’ costs 
incurred to make the film available for the audience. As indicated by the 
term they include both duplication (‘print’) and marketing (‘advertising’) 
costs. On average NOK 11.9 million was spent on production while NOK 
2.4 million was spent on P&A10.  
 
3.1 Public and Private Finance 
The financing of all the films included both public and private funds. The 
dominant source of public funding was the Norwegian Film Fund, which is 
the main body handling financial film support on behalf of the government. 
The fund’s production financing support is mainly channeled through two 
systems: One where the review process and funding decision is handled by 
one of its film consultants, who assesses both the film’s artistic and 
economic viability, and one where the funding decision is made primarily on 
the film’s projected market potential. For both systems the fund expects part 
of the budget to be financed by private sources, but while the private share of 
the finance may be as low as 20-30 percent of the budget under the  
                                                 
8 These include two films (“Grandpa is a Raisin” and “The Professor and the Story 
of the Origami Girl”) with running time less than the 72 minutes minimum required 
in the Film Fund’s feature definition, but the two films were still given independent 
theatrical releases and are thus of similar interest in terms of finance and market 
performance as the true features. 
9 All budget and financing figures are collected from the Norwegian Film Fund’s 
files for each of the 2005 films. 
10 Foreign P&A is not included in the financing. 
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Figure 3.1 The 2005 Films: Budgets 
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consultant system the fund requires at least 50 percent private funding before 
it will consider a film under the market review system. 
 
Table 3.1 The 2005 Films: Budgets 
 
Title Production Distribution Total 
100% Human 2,460,318 404,000 2,864,318 
37 and a Half 15,187,716 4,500,000 19,687,716 
Too Much Norway 16,120,000 1,650,000 17,770,000 
Love me Tomorrow 14,896,507 3,763,000 18,659,507 
An Enemy of the People 18,000,000 2,615,940 20,615,940 
Factotum 17,412,482 2,882,224 20,294,706 
The Giant 5,436,365 2,582,600 8,018,965 
Import Export 16,998,769 2,292,126 19,290,895 
Izzat 16,910,233 3,353,500 20,263,733 
Le Regard 10,824,811 1,500,000 12,324,811 
Loop 4,482,016 1,462,000 5,944,016 
Next Door 15,860,000 2,500,000 18,360,000 
Grandpa is a Raisin 2,673,979 1,001,212 3,675,191 
Pitbullterje 17,407,826 5,444,400 22,852,226 
Sinus 4,734,684 1,700,370 6,435,054 
The Professor and the Story 
of the Origami Girl 
2,551,904 760,000 3,311,904 
Tommy's Inferno 13,720,000 3,446,533 17,166,533 
Finding Friends 14,671,146 2,200,000 16,871,146 
Kissed by Winter  15,208,109 2,091,212 17,299,321 
AVERAGE 11,871,414 2,428,901 14,300,315 
 
Source: Norwegian Film Fund 
 
Other sources of public funding includes the Nordic Film and TV Fund, 
which provides production funds for films with theatrical distribution in at 
least two Nordic countries; Eurimages, which supports European co-
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production; as well as smaller contributions from various other Norwegian 
public funding bodies.  
 
For the average film 44 percent of the total budget was financed by the Film 
Fund and nine percent by other public funding sources. The balance 47 
percent was financed from private sources (see figure 3.2 and table 3.2). In 
relative terms, the private capital financing was strongest for the P&A where 
it covered 64 percent of the funding. The combined public funding was 
strongest in both relative and absolute terms for the production where it 
covered 56 percent of the costs.  
 
 
Figure 3.2 Average Film: Public and private finance 
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Source: Norwegian Film Fund 
 
 
Table 3.2 Average Film: Public and private finance 
 
Source Production P&A Total 
Film Fund 5,429,051 803,399 6,232,450 
Other Public Funding 1,240,567 70,390 1,310,957 
Private Capital 5,201,796 1,555,112 6,756,907 
Total 11,871,414 2,428,901 14,300,315 
 
Source: Norwegian Film Fund 
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The catalyst financing (Parra and Kahn, 2001) provided by public sources 
was thus very strong, covering more than half of the aggregate costs for all 
the 2005 films. 
 
3.2 Sources of Private Finance 
The structure of private financing varied significantly between the 19 films, 
but on average more than three quarters came from producer, distributor and 
the use of deferred payments. The insider element in the private financing 
was thus very strong.  
 
The exact breakdown of the private funding was made into the following 
categories (see figure 3.3, table 3.3 and table 3.4): 
 
Producer: This is the cash investment made by the film’s production 
company or companies if more than one was involved, which typically takes 
the form of an equity investment. Of the average NOK 6.8 million total 
private capital the producer contributed NOK 1.2 million or 18 percent. Yet, 
the variance from film to film is significant. Lowest producer cash 
contribution was zero while the highest represented 57 percent of that film’s 
private capital. The producer average investments cover almost equal shares 
of both the production and P&A budgets’ private capital financing with 18 
and 17 percent respectively. Note that the producer’s contribution to the 
financing in some cases was bigger than reflected in these numbers since the 
producer sometimes also deferred a share of its budgeted fees.  
 
Distributor: This is the cash investment made by the film’s distribution 
company, and on average it represents the largest share of total private 
capital with NOK 2.6 million or 39 percent – more than twice the producer 
investment. It is divided between production and P&A with NOK 1.5 million 
and NOK 1.1 million representing 29 and 70 percent of the private capital, 
showing not surprisingly that the distributor is the dominant private P&A 
investor. Again the variance is significant, from zero to 82 percent of total 
private capital. These cash investments are typically made in the form of 
MGs, but some are also made as equity investments. Some distributors also 
contributed deferments towards the P&A budget in addition to their cash 
investment, so the average combined cash and deferred contribution is 
higher than 70 percent. 
 
Deferments: These are budgeted production and P&A costs which are paid 
on a delayed basis out of the film’s revenues rather than out of the budgets. 
In addition to producer and distributor deferments were made by production 
and post-production service companies, suppliers and key personnel such as 
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writers, directors and cinematographers. On average deferments covered 
NOK 1.4 million or 21 percent of the total private capital. Most deferments 
were made in the production budget where they represented 25 percent of 
the private capital. The variance from film to film was significant with some 
films avoiding the use of deferments completely while the highest deferment 
share of total private capital was 67 percent. 
 
TV pre-sales: Some of the producers sold the television distribution rights 
before their film went into production and used the license fees to cover part 
of their private capital. Since many producers either chose not to do such 
pre-sales or were not able to, this source of private capital only represented 
three percent of the average total. The highest share was 24 percent, but this 
was for a lower budgeted film where a license fee at a typical level below the 
half million mark still can make up a quarter of the private capital. Funds 
from TV pre-sales were mostly allocated to cover production costs but in 
one case the entire pre-sale amount was included in the private P&A capital.  
 
TV investment: Two of the films had direct equity investments into the 
production from television companies. In one case the investment was 
combined with a pre-sale splitting the television company’s financial 
contribution into a pre-sale and an investment part. In the other case the full 
financial contribution was defined as an investment with no pre-sale 
recorded, but the TV company took co-producer status that likely secured 
television distribution rights. TV investments only made up for four percent 
of the average total and five percent of the average production investments, 
but for the two films that actually had such investments they made up an 
average 54 percent of the total private production finance indicating that TV 
companies may take an significant role in production financing. 
 
Foreign investment: These are investments made from a variety of foreign 
sources, but the primary sources were foreign co-producers and partners, 
distributors and television companies. The category thus largely represents 
the foreign equivalent to the producer, distributor and TV categories above. 
On average foreign investments represent 11 percent of the total private 
finance, but vary greatly dependent on the international character of each 
project from zero to 60 percent. 
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Table 3.3 Average Film: Sources of private capital 
 
Source Production P&A Total 
Producer 957,666 264,004 1,221,670 
Distributor 1,525,173 1,082,863 2,608,037 
Deferments 1,322,089 99,339 1,421,427 
TV pre-sales 166,842 19,222 186,064 
TV investment 278,947 0 278,947 
Foreign 743,327 0 743,327 
Other 207,751 89,684 297,436 
Total 5,201,796 1,555,112 6,756,907 
 
Source: Norwegian Film Fund 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Sources of private capital for the 2005 films 
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Table 3.4 Private capital spread for the 2005 films 
 
Source Low High Average 
Producer 0% 57% 18% 
Distributor 0% 82% 39% 
Deferments 0% 67% 21% 
TV pre-sales 0% 24% 3% 
TV investment 0% 73% 4% 
Foreign 0% 60% 11% 
Other 0% 21% 4% 
  
Source: Norwegian Film Fund 
3.3 Layering 
The financing structure of all the films had some element of layering, but 
varied from relatively simple structures to more sophisticated use of 
layering. However, the more advanced structures typically incorporated the 
basic elements of the simpler structures and one can thus see some overall 
common patterns. 
 
One common element was the finance provided by the Norwegian Film 
Fund. Repayment of monies provided by the fund for production and/or 
P&A costs were only due to start once the project had recouped an amount 
equal to 130 percent of its private capital, and at that point the share due to 
the fund equaled only 30 percent of its financing share. For instance, if the 
fund had financed 50 percent of a NOK 10 million film where the remaining 
share was covered by private capital, repayments to the fund would only 
start once the project had earned NOK 6.5 million and then only with 15 
percent of the revenues received from then on going forward. The financing 
provided by the fund was thus deeply subordinated to other sources of 
finance, in line with its role as a project “catalyst” (Parra and Kahn, 2001).  
 
Financing provided by distributors was another common element with 
relatively minor variance from project to project. The distributor’s finance 
was typically provided in the form of an MG with full repayment due off-
the-top in an exclusive first priority position ahead of any other financier. 
Furthermore, the distributor would typically be granted distribution rights to 
more than one media outlet or window (e.g. theatrical and home-video) with 
the right to cross-collaterise revenues so that ancillary market income would 
be fully allocated to recoup the MG should it not be covered by theatrical 
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revenues. Hence, in the project financing the distributor takes a position 
similar to that of a senior lender (Parra and Kahn, 2001). 
 
The Norwegian Film Fund and distributors thus generally defined a bottom 
and top layer in each film’s financing as illustrated in figure 3.4. 
 
Figure 3.4 Common layering for the 2005 films 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In between these common upper and lower layers the variance seemed to be 
greater, and due to incomplete data also more difficult to map. The 
documentation available as well as interview data did suggest that equity 
investments in some cases took seniority over deferments and that 
deferments could be split in layers (with for instance producer’s deferments 
being subordinated to suppliers’ deferments), but also that various financing 
sources other than distributor’s MG and public funding could be treated on a 
pro rata basis in one single layer. In one case the distributor’s production 
finance was recouped on a pro rata basis with all other equity investments 
following the distributor’s P&A finance, which was treated as an MG, and 
prior to the payment of deferred fees (figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.5 Example of layering for a single film 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Norwegian Film Fund 
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4. The 2005 Films: Performance 
 
The overall theatrical performance of Norwegian national films in 2005 was 
slightly weaker, but at the same level as the previous and following years. Of 
the total theatrical gross income the share held by national films was 12.5 
percent, and of a total 230 films released that year 20 was Norwegian 
(including one reissued film excluded from this study) (Film & Kino, 2006). 
Yet, in line with the conclusions drawn by DeVany and Walls (1999) on 
motion picture market behavior, the performance varied dramatically from 
one film to another with some performing very well earning strong profits 
while others failed to find an audience and thus returned great losses to its 
investors.  
 
4.1 Sources of income 
The main sources of income for national films include both the usual sources 
of market revenues as well as public funding from the Norwegian Film Fund 
in the form of box office bonuses. The market revenues were split in two 
categories: 
 
Theatrical revenues: The theatrical gross income from ticket sales (the box 
office) is split between cinema-owners and distributors, and the distributor’s 
share (the film rental) is split between distributor and producer. The 
producer’s share goes into the project pot that according to the film’s 
waterfall first is used to service and recoup project lenders and investors and 
then, if sufficient, to earn a profit for the film’s investors and other profit 
participants. The producer’s theatrical revenues, which thus represent project 
cash flow, are calculated as 25 percent of the total box office gross11.  
 
Ancillary revenues: This category includes all project cash flow or revenues 
earned by the producer from exploitation of the film in all other markets, 
including home-video (DVD), pay and free TV, new media and foreign 
sales. In this report it is assumed that revenues from ancillary markets 
constitute 50 percent of producer’s total market revenues, i.e. that ancillary 
revenues equal producer’s theatrical revenues12.  
 
                                                 
11 This is the same share as used by the Norwegian Ministry of Culture and Church 
Affairs in their calculations for St. meld. nr. 25, 2003-2004. 
12 The Norwegian Film and Television Producers’ Association has indicated that the 
ancillary share may be as high as 82 percent (St. meld. nr. 25, 2003-2004). 
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While all market earnings in this report are calculated based on reported 
revenues in only one market, the domestic theatrical market, the actual 
revenues reported to the film fund for eight of the films suggest that the 
calculated figures are quite accurate compared to actual figures. Total 
calculated revenues for these eight films were only 5.5 percent over the 
actual reported revenues. 
 
The box office bonuses paid out by the Norwegian Film Fund to the 
producers equal 55 percent of the film’s gross box office and are paid out up 
until the film’s private capital plus overhead have been recouped from 
market revenues and box office bonuses. The actual bonus figures paid out 
to the 19 films were provided by the fund. 
 
For the average film box office bonuses accounted for 53 percent of 
producer’s total revenues or project cash flow generated while theatrical and 
ancillary markets accounted for 23.5 percent each (see table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1 Average Film: Sources of revenues 
 
Producer's theatrical revenues 1,276,942 23.5% 
Producer's ancillary revenues 1,276,942 23.5% 
Film Fund Box Office Bonuses 2,873,705 52.9% 
Total 5,427,589 100.0% 
 
Source: Norwegian Film Fund 
4.2 Return on capital 
Generally one would not expect a positive return on capital for a Norwegian 
film. With the limited size of its home market and facing a significant 
cultural discount in foreign markets13 it has proven very difficult for national 
films to generate revenues sufficient to cover their production and 
distribution costs. Positive returns would also undermine the argument for 
public funding which has played a major role in the Norwegian film business 
for decades. If the typical Norwegian film would produce a positive return 
on its capital, it would fulfill general requirements for project financing 
(Finnerty, 1996) and should be able to find the necessary financing without 
public support.  
 
                                                 
13 For a discussion of cultural discount effects see e.g. Hoskins et al (1988) 
 31
Figure 4.1 Return on capital for the 2005 films 
 
 
Source: Norwegian Film Fund 
-1
00
%
-8
0%
-6
0%
-4
0%
-2
0%0%20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
Best Performance
Worst Performance
 32
The simple measurement for return on capital used here is the ratio of money 
gained or lost relative to the money invested in each film project; where the 
money invested refers to the total budget. It is not annualized or in any other 
way adjusted to the time period the investment is held.  
 
Aggregate figures for all 19 films show a loss of 62 percent, meaning that of 
the total NOK 272 million invested into the films by private and public 
parties NOK 169 million were left uncovered by aggregate revenues. The 
average film with a budget of NOK 14.3 million would incur a loss of NOK 
8.9 million. 
 
However, there is no typical or average film since box office revenue 
outcomes do not converge to an average (DeVany and Walls, 1999), and this 
is of course reflected in the return on capital figures. The significant spread 
in return on capital among the 19 films released in 2005 is shown in figure 
4.1 above. The return is ranging from a seven percent gain to a 97 percent 
loss. The best performing film, which could show the seven percent gain, 
was the only film with a positive return on its total capital. All other showed 
losses. 14 films lost more than 50 percent and six films showed losses of 
more than 90 percent. 
 
4.3 Return on private capital 
A more relevant measure to examine why participation from the traditional 
investment community in film financing is absent is to look at the return on 
private capital. Of the aggregate figures private capital represents 47 percent 
of the total budgets or the total capital, with a range among the individual 
films from 25 to 89 percent. And it is the return on this capital which will be 
a decisive factor for a potential investor in the traditional investment 
community considering participation in a national film. 
 
When calculating the return on private capital it is assumed that all private 
capital takes a priority position in the waterfall not only to the financing 
provided by the Norwegian Film Fund but also to all other public funding. It 
is furthermore assumed that the public funding is non-recoupable. 
Repayments are so minor and only affect the most successful films, so 
omitting such repayments here does not have any significant effect on the 
whole picture. Finally, it is assumed that all types of private capital are 
recoupable at 100 percent of the amount invested in the film. This latter 
assumption creates a simplified picture of the real world as some funding for 
instance may be recoupable with a fixed mark-up (e.g. 120 percent of the 
amount invested) and some contributions may not be recoupable but made in 
consideration for certain exploitation rights (e.g. TV pre-sales). Still, such  
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Figure 4.2 Return on total and private capital for the 2005 films 
 
 
Source: Norwegian Film Fund 
-1
00
%
-8
0%
-6
0%
-4
0%
-2
0%0%20
%
40
%
60
%
80
%
10
0%
Best Performance
Worst Performance
Pr
iv
at
e 
C
ap
ita
l
To
ta
l C
ap
ita
l
 34
adjustments are relatively minor and primarily related to the division of 
cashflow among private capital providers, so the return on private capital 
calculations thus provide a fairly accurate measure of the overall gains and 
losses incurred for the private capital invested into the 19 films. 
 
With the private capital taking a priority position to public funding the return 
is considerably better than for the total capital. Aggregate figures for all 19 
films show a loss of 20 percent as opposed to the 62 percent loss for total 
capital. Of the NOK 128 million put into the 19 films as private capital NOK 
25 million were lost.  
 
Again, results for individual films were widely diverse. While the best 
performing film could return a strong 92 percent gain14 to its private capital 
investors, the worst performing film produced a loss of 95 percent. Five of 
the 19 films had positive returns, all showing gains above 35 percent. The 
rest, however, lost money for its private capital investors. Ten lost 50 percent 
or more, and eight produced losses of 75 percent or more (see figure 4.2).  
 
4.4 Layering and distribution of losses 
The effects of layering on distribution of revenues and thus on distribution of 
gains and losses are already illustrated in the previous two sections. By 
taking a subordinated position to private capital public funding bodies 
greatly improves the return on capital for private investors. Hence, these 
public financiers are fulfilling a catalyst function in the project financing 
(Parra and Kahn, 2001). If private and public capital had not been layered 
but treated on an equal pro-rata basis, private investors in the best 
performing film would only have seen a modest return of seven percent 
instead of the very healthy 92 percent gain obtained when given priority. 
And it would only have been the private investors in this single film that 
would have seen any positive return on their investments, instead of all 
private investors in the five best performing films who saw positive returns 
with this simple layering (see figure 4.2). 
 
But as discussed in section 3.3 above, also the private capital is typically 
layered, so not all private investors are exposed to the same combinations of 
risks and rewards. Examining how layering of the private capital affects 
                                                 
14 Incorporating repayment of public funding in line with film fund requirements at 
the time the return on private capital would have been 83 percent for this film. For 
the other four profitable films public funding repayment would have had a 
significantly lesser effect. 
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distribution of losses illustrates the relationship between risk and layering in 
film finance. 
 
A film’s distributor typically takes an exclusive first priority position for its 
investment. Assuming that all distributors of the 2005 films took such 
priority position for all their private capital contributions15 a top layer of 
distribution investments may be separated from the private capital layer 
(figure 4.3).  
 
Figure 4.3 Adding a priority layer for distributor’s investments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For the average film where the distributor contributes 39 percent of the 
private capital such priority layering would reduce its loss from 20 percent to 
zero. For all other providers of private capital, however, taking a 
subordinated position to the distributor would increase the loss from 20 to 32 
percent.  
 
Applying this layering, the distribution of losses among distributors and 
other private capital investors for the 19 films are shown in figure 4.4 below. 
Generally, losses are shifted from distributors onto other private investors. 
The distributors, which invested in 18 of the 19 films, would incur zero 
losses in 11 films. For five films the distributor would lose between one and 
49 percent of its investment, and for two films the loss would be between 50 
and 99 percent. For none of the films it would loose its full investment. 
Other private investors, however, would now only avoid losses for five 
                                                 
15 At least one distributor accepted part of its investment in a second priority layer 
pro-rata with equity investors (see figure 3.5) so this assumption provides a slightly 
simplified picture of the actual layering of distributors finance. 
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films, loose between one and 49 percent in three films, between 50 and 99 
percent in four films, and for seven films their full investments would be 
lost. Without this layering no private investor would have lost their full 
investment. 
 
Figure 4.4 Distribution of private capital losses 
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This shows how distributors, who are the largest contributor of private 
capital to Norwegian films, to a large extend avoid losses by insisting on a 
lower-risk first priority position for their investments. A significantly higher 
risk and a larger share of the losses are taken by other private investors, but 
they may of course compensate by demanding a larger share of potential 
gains, which would be typical for providers of subordinated project finance 
unless they are taking a catalyst role (Parra and Kahn, 2001). 
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Figure 4.5 Adding a subordinated layer for deferments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To further illustrate the effect of layering one may assume that all 
deferments took a subordinated position to all other private capital, thus 
creating a third layer of private capital (figure 4.5). It cannot be shown from 
the documentation obtained that this is a typical position for deferments even 
if it were used, so adding this layer is for illustrative and not descriptive 
purposes.  
 
For the average film the addition of a deferment layer, which represents 21 
percent of the private capital, would reduce the loss for other private capital 
investors from 32 percent to zero. The distributor would retain its priority 
position with zero losses, so the full loss of private capital investors would 
be carried by the deferrers who would loose 94 percent of their deferred 
amounts. 
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Box 4.1 The averaged film with three layers of private capital 
 
 
 
Capital
Total budget 14,300,315
Private capital 6,756,907
Distributor investment 2,608,037 39%
Deferments 1,421,427 21%
Other private capital 2,727,444 40%
Revenues
Producer's theatrical reveneus 1,276,942
Producer's anncillary revenues 1,276,942
Film Fund box office bonuses 2,873,705
Total 5,427,589
Layered recoupment
Distributor's investment 2,608,037 100%
Other private capital 2,727,444 100%
Deferments 92,109 6%
Total 5,427,589 80%  
 
 
 
The distribution of losses with this three-layer private capital financing is 
shown in figure 4.6. The “other private capital” (OPC) category from figure 
4.4, which included deferrers, is here split into a new “other private capital” 
category and a separate deferments category. The “other private capital” 
category including deferments from figure 4.4 is shown as the first column 
in figure 4.6 for comparison. The distributor’s situation would be unchanged 
from figure 4.4 and is thus not shown here. 
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Figure 4.6 Distribution of losses between 2nd and 3rd layer parties 
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The other private capital investors who incurred zero losses for five films 
while tied into the same layer as the deferrers would now enjoy zero losses 
for nine films. The number of films for which deferrers would incur zero 
losses would however fall from five to two. Losses between one and 49 
percent would incur in one film for other private investors and two films for 
deferrers as opposed to in three films when they were tied in the same layer. 
Both would reduce the number of films with losses between 50 and 99 
percent from four to two. The number of films in which all would be lost 
would remain seven for other private capital investors but increase to nine 
for the deferrers.  
 
The effects of adding layers are summarized in table 4.4 below. Assuming 
up to three layers of private capital for distributors, deferrers and others the 
performance figures from the 2005 films show how these parties would face 
very different results depending on the structure chosen. Adding 
subordinated layers offer significant security to participants in priority layers 
while it adds risk to those recouping their funds in the new lower layers. 
 
Table 4.4 Average return on private capital 
 
 1 layer 2 layers 3 layers 
Distributors -20% 0% 0% 
Other Private Capital -20% -32% 0% 
Deferrers -20% -32% -94% 
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5. Challenges and Opportunities 
The Norwegian film sector faces a number of challenges when attempting to 
attract private capital from the traditional investment community. The 
findings presented in the previous two chapters indicate that a negative 
overall return on private capital and the uncertainty stemming from extreme 
performance outcomes may be among the most important. However, the 
analysis also suggests that the use of layered financing, which is already 
employed in Norwegian film financing, may be used to create lower-risk 
investment opportunities that may better fit the appetites of traditional 
investors. 
 
5.1 Negative returns and uncertainty 
The aggregate figures for all 2005 films show a negative return on private 
capital of 20 percent. Generally, capital is drawn to the investment 
opportunities offering the best return and it is thus likely that traditional 
investors pay more attention to other sectors of the economy which can offer 
better profitability.  
 
Looking solely at this overall return-figure the question becomes less why 
investors from the traditional financial community stay out, but rather why 
industry insiders choose to invest. One reason may be that industry insiders 
also have nonpecuniary motives for their investment decision in addition to 
the expected financial return on investment. Suppliers as well as crew and 
cast may for instance accept partially deferred fees just to be able to 
participate in a project so that they can build reputation and network (Blair et 
al., 2003), and those who exercise any creative influence may also seek 
critical praise and the enjoyment that flows from artistic labor (Cowen and 
Tabarrok, 2000).  
 
It may also be argued that 2005 perhaps was not a very good year for 
Norwegian films. While a slight dip in the national films’ market share from 
both the previous and the following year16 indicates that there may be some 
truth in such argument, it is not likely that it is sufficient to generally 
eliminate the problem of an overall weak return on private capital. 
 
Adding to the challenges is a high level of uncertainty. Findings presented 
herein are in line with DeVany and Walls’ (1999) conclusions; the 
                                                 
16 National films’ share of total box office: 13.7% in 2004; 12.5% in 2005; 15.3% in 
2006. The number of national films released each year was 20, including reissues 
(Film&Kino, 2007) 
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distribution of performance outcomes among the films does not converge to 
an average and extreme outcomes are common. That some films may show 
healthy return on capital above 50 percent, as noted in the 2004 government 
white paper (St. meld. Nr. 25, 2003-2004), does not provide any strong 
indication of the general level of return under such conditions. This 
underlying uncertainty is creating a high level of investment risk, which is 
likely to discourage potential traditional investors.  
 
The distribution out performance outcomes may, however, also explain why 
insiders do invest. Some films make healthy returns on their private capital, 
which means that some insiders make significant profits. 
 
It is reasonable to assume that producers strive to maximize revenues from 
their films, and if the uneven distribution of performance outcomes is 
characteristic for the market, as DeVany and Walls (1999) claim, trying to 
alter this would be unrealistic. The question thus becomes how to best adapt.  
 
5.2 Creating layered investment opportunities 
Given the distribution of performance outcomes, appealing to the most risk-
seeking investors should be relatively easy, but expanding the pool of 
potential investors to include also the more risk-averse requires structuring 
of the private financing. Layered finance mitigates risk for senior investors 
by adding layers of subordinated investors that are typically compensated by 
rights to potentially higher returns (Parra and Kahn, 1999). 
 
The analysis of how layering affects distribution of revenues in section 4.4 
above demonstrates to what degree risk may be reduced for priority-layer 
investors when adding subordinated layers. Average losses for the most 
senior investors, the distributors, which represent almost 40 percent of the 
private financing, are reduced from 20 percent to zero. This may also explain 
why these particular insiders do invest.  
 
But it also demonstrates that by the use of layering one may find structures 
containing investment opportunities that fit the risk and return appetites of 
more risk-averse investors within the traditional financing community.  
 
Offering relatively risk-averse outside investors priority positioning (gap 
financing deals or similar) requires willingness and ability to take higher risk 
among insiders currently holding those positions, - primarily distributors. 
Otherwise these would drop out and new outsiders would become substitutes 
to current insiders, and the objective of a higher aggregate level of private 
financing would not be met. The willingness and ability to assume risks 
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among various parties depend on the benefits each expect to derive, their 
financial strength and business objectives, and the perceived likelihood that 
those bearing risks will be compensated fully for doing so (Finnerty, 1996). 
Careful financial engineering that both exploit insiders’ nonpecuniary 
incentives (Cowen and Tabarrok, 2000; Blair et al., 2003) and provide fair 
distribution of the potentially significant returns relative to risks taken would 
thus be required to structure the film financing in a way that fits all potential 
investors’ requirements in a mutually acceptable manner. 
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